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Introduction 
 
For an organisation active for three-quarters of the twentieth 
century and heavily backed by some of Britain’s largest 
companies, it is astonishing how little is known about the 
Economic League. Founded after the First World War by well-
known and influential individuals from the upper echelons of 
business to ‘disseminate economic knowledge [and] put forward 
the case for capitalism amongst the working class’,1 ephemera 
produced by the League, especially for the period between the two 
world wars, was circulated by the million and still survives in 
significant quantities. However, the totality of published academic 
historical research into its activities extends to just one article and 
one (self-published) book, by Arthur McIvor in 1988 and Mike 
Hughes in 1994, respectively.2 Never at any point willing to 
divulge its past secrets, the League denied McIvor access to its 
archives while Hughes based his work on a handful of published 
sources. Late 1980s and early 1990s investigative journalism by 
Paul Foot and others into the League’s systematic blacklisting of 
workers brought about its collapse in 1993, and with it – it appears 
– the deliberate destruction of its records.3 Thus, until now, 
Hughes’s work marked the end of research into its activities.  
 
McIvor and Hughes did, nevertheless, succeed in establishing the 
League’s importance in ‘crusad[ing] for capitalism’4 and shedding 
much-needed light on its unsavoury activities. Nevertheless, very 
little remains known. Research for the period before 1945 has 
tended to focus upon the League’s blacklisting and (occasionally) 
strikebreaking tactics, which ran parallel to its public propaganda 
and pamphleting machine. This work has led to it being ranked as 
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one of the most powerful and most durable employer 
organisations of the time.5 Outside of this sphere (and excepting 
the journalism that ended the League’s existence in the 1990s), the 
League’s place in history is confined to footnotes or margins, and 
when touched upon in other studies it is almost uniformly 
concerned with British fascism and anti-socialist activities, or the 
history of radical politics between the Wars. As a result, some 
basic questions remain open and unanswered. First, while the 
League’s founding figures are known, attempts to probe their 
connections to politics and finance to establish the League’s 
influence have not yet been made. Similarly, how the League was 
financed or the capital made available to it to carry out its work is 
a topic shrouded in almost complete mystery. Most importantly, 
for an organisation that sought first and foremost to ‘champion 
capitalism as a cause’, its success against this measure has been 
afforded less attention than its operation of blacklists, which were 
for many years an afterthought to the League’s main activities. In 
short, how ‘powerful’ the Economic League actually was has not 
yet been fully interrogated.   
 
Thus, this paper has two goals. First, it attempts to answer some of 
the questions about the League’s membership and finance. 
Second, it seeks to understand the League’s ‘power’ by viewing it 
through a different lens, not only as a shadowy organisation 
whose dubious activities warrant highlighting, but as an 
organisation with aims and objectives like any other, which took 
decisions that can be evaluated and whose success one can 
attempt to measure. To achieve this, it is clear that the years of 
initial defence planning and subsequent arms expenditure 
programme from c.1932 to 1940 require a re-examination from an 
employer, rather than employee, perspective.  
 
Rearmament presented the League with a challenge only rivalled 
by the 1926 General Strike in its (then) short history. The period 
witnessed a strong rebound in the skilled labour market, and the 
rediscovered bargaining power for workers also brought about a 
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revival in organised labour and trade unionism, which had been 
severely weakened by several years of low demand. For 
employers, this heightened the prospect of workplace agitation 
and strikes for better pay and conditions.6 The League’s response 
to the rearmament drive highlights its political-cum-class 
character, the strength of its membership, and the extent of its 
influence upon major industrial events. In particular, an 
examination of the ‘Information and Research Department’ (IRD) 
– an arm distinct from its public propaganda and blacklisting 
activities – can, where material survives, highlight the success (or 
failure) of the League’s rhetoric and ‘research’ to alter 
circumstances in its favour.  
 
The League’s activities in this period are reconstructed in this 
article through a reading of surviving evidence from a selection of 
primarily shipbuilding and engineering firms active in armaments 
manufacture during the 1930s. Much of this is being presented for 
the first time.7 In particular, the League’s research papers – 
provided directly to firms in a more bespoke manner than the 
widespread propaganda pamphlets – are analysed in order to 
show a side of the League not covered in the handful of broader 
studies. Crucially, these companies sat at the heart of the 
rearmament drive, employed tens of thousands of skilled staff in 
working-class areas of cities – particularly Glasgow, which by the 
1930 had suffered significant unemployment as a result of the 
weak economic outlook and disarmament drive of the preceding 
decade. At the top, the firms were run by men with long-standing 
connections to Conservative politics, who were some of Britain’s 
leading industrial figures of the day in their own right.8 Moreover, 
the critical importance of efficient rearmament in the later 1930s – 
and the related impact of workplace stoppages on it – cannot be 
underestimated.9 In short, in the 1930s, it was precisely these kinds 
of places where the success or failure of the League’s ‘crusade for 
capitalism’ would be most keenly felt. 
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There is also a related methodological advantage to approaching 
the League’s work in this way. The shadowy nature of the 
organisation and refusal to make public its research to non-
subscribers has hindered the attempts of journalists and historians 
alike to understand both the scope of its actions and the depth of 
its relationship with industry. By contrast, some of the industries 
that supported it have for the most part large and accessible 
archival collections, and have often retained copies of confidential 
League material. These are not easily located. Firstly, because no 
complete list of pre-1945 subscribers survives and, secondly, 
because material is often scattered thinly across a collection - 
sometimes in the personal files of a director or shareholder, 
sometimes attached to reports, sometimes even in official 
correspondence. Nevertheless, when found, it offers fascinating 
insights into the operations of the League and the relationships 
formed between it and business leaders.  
 
Of course, it is still, regrettably, an incomplete and often one-sided 
tale. Letters sent back from the individual in reply to the League 
are most likely long lost or destroyed, and it cannot be ascertained 
whether the most delicate of material was not, in fact, intentionally 
destroyed many decades before the League’s demise (and before 
the material reached the archive at all). However, the use of such 
sources allows the best remaining opportunity for more 
information to be obtained and for more definite conclusions to be 
drawn. The analysis of this original material is preceded by a re-
examination of the League’s formation and early years. This 
establishes the context within which the League conducted its 
activities during the rearmament years.  
 
Formation and establishment 
 
The League’s establishment has been traced to ‘early 1919’ by 
Hughes or between December 1919 and January 1920 by McIvor,10 
although the 1937-9 annual reports put the date between the two, 
in August.11 Also, while the League has typically been 
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characterised as an ‘employers’ organisation’,12 this is not the full 
picture; although existing primarily to support the capitalist cause, 
a number of prominent members of the League throughout the 
interwar period came also from political or military spheres. The 
initiative behind the League’s formation came from Sir Reginald 
Hall, then Conservative MP and decorated former Rear Admiral 
and Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) during the First World 
War. Prior to this, Hall had been Assistant Controller of the Royal 
Navy from 1911-1913 and responsible, along with the Third Sea 
Lord, for material and procurement, resulting in numerous senior 
industrial contacts.13 At one point, it was claimed his reputation 
stood so high that he was spoken of as future Foreign Secretary.14 
He is perhaps best known today for heading the secret 
codebreaking section ‘Room 40’ from 1914 to 1918, which 
reported, for a time at least, directly to Winston Churchill.15 
  
Though Churchill later moved to the Ministry of Munitions, the 
two kept in close working contact. Here, Churchill headed an 
organisation remembered mainly for its successful and long-
standing collaboration with business leaders, and where industry 
aided the government on procurement issues by sending some of 
its most senior employees to work with the Ministry’s civil and 
military staff. This arrangement helped overcome severe 
production bottlenecks for the Navy and Army – particularly in 
shell production – and lasted until the Ministry’s disbandment in 
the first years of peace.16 Hall, thus, was in possession of a unique 
skill set: he had in-depth knowledge of espionage; extensive 
military, business and political connections; and direct experience 
of industry and arms manufacture. This combination of contacts 
and experiences was particularly valuable in tackling industrial 
bottlenecks which had been exacerbated by strikes and/or a lack 
of skilled labour. The organisation he founded would make ample 
use of such abilities.  
 
Hall, perhaps unsurprisingly, had little trouble finding support in 
business circles. Sir Allan Smith, director of the Engineering 
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Employers’ Federation; Cuthbert Laws, General Manager of the 
Shipping Federation; Sir Arthur Balfour, a Sheffield steel magnate; 
and Evan Williams, director of the Mining Association; these four 
were among the League’s founding members. They were joined by 
Major Richard C. Kelly, director of the National Publicity Agency, 
and the Conservative MP, businessman (and double Olympic gold 
medallist), John Gretton. Hall was elected to chair the new 
organisation – he continued in this capacity until 1924 – which 
first took the name ‘National Propaganda’, before settling upon 
the familiar Economic League title that it would hold for almost 70 
years.17 In sum, while not uniformly composed of businessmen, 
the League’s remarkably senior membership gave it legitimacy as 
an industrial organisation almost from the very outset. 
 
Most of these figures, or at the very least the bodies they 
represented, had already been in close contact with Hall’s 
department during his spells at the Admiralty before the war, and 
at the Ministry of Munitions during it.18 Furthermore, they knew 
one another; Balfour, Williams and Smith had, for example, 
previously collaborated closely on a Coal Industry Commission 
report for the government.19 These were also men of quite serious 
repute and wealth, trusted in both political and business circles. 
Extremists on the fringes they certainly were not. The stature of 
the initial membership was equalled by its budget: a figure 
believed to be quarter of a million pounds was set aside – a 
substantial sum in the early 1920s.20  
 
Activities, membership and finance 
 
With a significant budget and a steering group drawn from the 
heads of the largest employers’ representative bodies, the League 
quickly established itself; by the beginning of 1927 it claimed to 
have held almost 23,000 meetings in the previous three years, with 
a combined audience of almost four million.21 It was around this 
time that the League also diversified its portfolio of activities. With 
the propaganda arm now well-established and capable of 
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distributing close to a million leaflets a year, the League then 
looked to form a research department to ‘collect facts and figures 
and prepare reports, pamphlets, etc. on social and industrial 
problems’.22 Its purpose was to provide subscribers with more in-
depth studies that would inform them while its leaflets educated 
their employees.  
 
The League claimed this aspect of its work was particularly 
successful. In its 1938 Annual Report, at the peak of rearmament, 
the League claimed a year of ‘record activity’ for its IRD. The 
League asserted that ‘again and again the value of research was 
proved … the number of enquiries dealt with was exactly 200, an 
increase in 14 over the previous year’.23 The enquiries themselves 
were fairly varied; they included providing details of the Soviet 
Constitution, explaining the results of the introduction of holiday 
pay in France, and a comparison of the wages and working hours 
of miners at home and abroad.24 It is, however, important to note 
that these were not intended as propaganda or to be distributed to 
the public – these were often highly confidential documents 
intended to influence opinion at boardroom level. 
 
Much of the impetus for this arm seems to have come from a John 
Baker White, who directed the League for the 13 years preceding 
the outbreak of war. Unlike the decorated and highly experienced 
Hall who led the league until 1924, or the professor, surgeon, 
businessman and Board of Trade President, Auckland Geddes, 
who succeeded him, Baker White was just twenty-four years old 
when he assumed the directorship in 1926, with just a few years’ 
prior experience in anti-socialist organisations. Indeed, until 1923, 
he had not held a full-time job.25 Nevertheless, he got the role – 
much to his surprise – and a £400 a year salary to match. He had 
some background in intelligence, though in comparison to Hall it 
seems almost comically amateur: Baker White’s connection to 
espionage was through a short-lived job in Special Branch 
(obtained through his step-father, an unpaid personal assistant 
there) as a mail courier.26 
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It is important to note that Baker White was not the President, or 
even the Chairman, of the Economic League. He had significant 
stature, but was not responsible for deciding the direction of the 
League in the way Hughes has asserted.27 In the organisational 
structure, he sat below – albeit as a member of – the Central 
Council. Nevertheless, in the role of director he was responsible 
for the day-to-day running of the League, and in practice it was 
highly unlikely to ever see any correspondence from the League 
signed by anyone more senior than Baker White. It also seems that 
he brought youthful zeal to the organisation, as over the next 
decade and a half he published numerous short books on 
communism and socialism, including Red Russia Arms (1932), The 
Innocents Club (1935) and The Red Network (1939), and edited or 
provided sections and forewords for many more.28 Still, one 
should not make too many grand claims at this juncture: much of 
the League’s research was mundane. The main output of the IRD 
was the Economic League Bulletin, which was available to 
subscribers of £5 or more annually, and offered commentary on 
international events or even book reviews that were for the most 
part not particularly revealing or confidential.  
 
Some, however, was far more dubious. Upon request, or when it 
directly benefitted the League’s goals, the IRD supplied employers 
with lists and dossiers of organisations and individuals who it 
regarded as ‘dangerous subversives’. When the communist 
newspaper, the Daily Worker, obtained confidential letters between 
Baker White and Manchester police some years later in 1937, the 
League was forced to admit their authenticity – albeit by taking 
the newspaper to court (and winning) in a bid get the letters back. 
This would be the tip of the iceberg: the League is now best-
known for the major blacklisting operation that continued 
throughout its history.29 Of course, Hughes and particularly 
McIvor have covered the early history of the League and the secret 
blacklisting organisation in admirable detail elsewhere, despite 
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the lack of source material, elsewhere and as such there is little 
more to add here.30  
 
Leaving this, and the IRD, to one side for a moment, it is also 
necessary to understand the composition and financing of the 
League, for herein lie clues to its overall strength. The annual 
reports during rearmament offer an insight into the type of men 
(and it was men – one solitary woman sat amongst more than 160 
male counterparts) that ran the organisation. A sample of the 
League’s central council and regional bodies from 1937, in the 
midst of rearmament, reveals the League had many noteworthy 
individuals. Aside from Balfour (now a Vice President of the 
League) these included business luminaries Lord McGowan and 
Sir Christopher Clayton – the sole Managing Director and 
Ordinary Director of Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) 
respectively – along with shipping and shipbuilding magnates, 
coal pit owners, four Lords, several past and present politicians 
(including four sitting MPs), over 30 senior military figures (Army 
captain or above) including nine full colonels and one major-
general, and a great many more knights, senior civil servants or 
magistrates.  
 
Compared with McIvor’s similar study of the composition in 1925 
(where two Lords, one ex-minister and five ex-MPs were 
represented)31, 1937 shows the League to have further increased its 
standing. It was, insofar as all were wealthy males, a ‘diverse’ 
body drawn from across Britain and across the fields of business, 
politics, law and the military.32 In the same report the League 
claimed a total of 523 new supporters in the previous two years 
alone, while its quarterly bulletin claims a paid-for circulation of 
3,500. Subscribing to the bulletin required a fairly large financial 
commitment of five pounds or more per annum (roughly 
equivalent to two weeks’ wages, and more than five times higher 
than LRD’s subscription rate).33  
 
 129 
Again, comparing this with figures for the following year, 1938, 
which showed 428 new members in the previous two years but 
added just 100 to the bulletin’s circulation, it would appear that 
either more than half of the League’s supporters paid something, 
but less than the minimum required to receive the quarterly 
newsletter, or the League had an extremely high turnover of 
members. Assuming a ‘truth’ somewhere in the middle, the 
League’s active membership – as opposed to those who read its 
pamphlets or bought its books – was likely to have been in the 
region of 5,000-8,000 during the second half of the 1930s.  
 
In a similar vein, McIvor pointed out that, in common with other 
right-wing and strike-breaking organisations, there is a certain 
amount of mystery surrounding the financing of the Economic 
League.34 For one, its financial position was never disclosed, even 
in the annual reports available exclusively to subscribers. As such, 
there is no clear picture of how well funded the League was at any 
point before 1939. This being said, some basic calculations can be 
made from available sources. For example, in 1938, the League 
claimed a circulation of 3,600 copies of each edition of its quarterly 
bulletin.35 The minimum level of subscription in order to receive 
the bulletin was five pounds per annum, indicating at the very 
least £18,000 per year from this route alone. This is, however, to 
vastly underestimate donations; probably as many again provided 
the League with some funds below the five pound threshold, 
while some particularly affluent members gave ten times this 
figure regularly. It has also been claimed others channelled the 
resources of their own propaganda departments to the League 
instead.36  
 
Most tellingly, in letters to John Brown’s shipbuilders in 
Clydebank and Atlas & Norfolk steel yards in Sheffield in 1936, 
the League noted a pricing plan based on one shilling per 
employee.37 The League claimed that its subscribers totalled more 
than two million employees. This equates, very roughly, to a total 
subscriber income at the beginning of the rearmament period of 
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well over £100,000 per year, assuming only that the minimum was 
paid. Adding to this figure the individual members plus the sales 
of books and pamphlets, which cost anything from a penny to six 
shillings, and had claimed circulations in the tens of thousands,38 
it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the income received by 
the League in a typical year during rearmament would have been 
upwards of £120,000. Indeed, LRD’s own calculations for the years 
after the war, which estimated £142,000 in income for 1951, or the 
special ‘National Defence Campaign’ the League launched in 1937, 
which aimed for £100,000 in donations, seems to support these 
calculations.39 Such a level of support enabled the League to 
finance a substantial body of staff, a fleet of distribution vehicles 
(known as the ‘flying squad’), and the publication of millions of 
leaflets annually during the 1930s.40  
 
Rearmament 
 
Rearmament first came to public attention in March 1935, when 
the National Government published a white paper on defence, 
stating the inadequacy of the current condition of the RAF, Navy 
and Army and the need to spend more to rectify this.41 While 
Frank McDonough and others have called this ‘the starting point 
of British rearmament in the 1930s’42, preparations had, in fact, 
been going on behind the scenes in government for at least 18 
months prior to that date, and the League’s connections had 
allowed it some warning of what was to come. In response not to 
Hitler’s rise in 1933 but to the Japanese threat to British interests 
following the invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, the 
government had convened a Defence Requirements Committee 
(DRC), which met for the first time in November 1933. The 
government also made use of the Principal Supply Officers 
Committee (PSOC), which had existed since the first half of the 
1920s, and was in some ways a successor to the disbanded war-
time Ministry of Munitions. Like the Ministry, the PSOC sought to 
make use of industrial knowledge to ease supply and 
procurement issues in the military. Indeed, the Ministry’s 
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existence was owed to the ‘Shell Crisis’ in ammunition production 
in 1915, while the PSOC had come into existence upon the 
recommendation of several reports, one of which had been 
produced by prominent industrialist and former Ministry 
member, Lord Weir.43 In October 1933, the PSOC invited three 
prominent business leaders into the fold to discuss future war 
needs. These men were Lord Weir, chairman of the giant 
engineering group of the same name, Sir James Lithgow, of the 
Lithgow brothers’ shipyards and on the board of ailing arms firm, 
Beardmore, and once more, Sir Arthur Balfour, now Vice-
President of the Economic League.44 
 
Like the initial membership of the League, or the composition of 
the defunct Ministry of Munitions, this panel placed three senior 
industrial leaders close to men with in-depth, secret military 
knowledge.45 Like the League, the trio were well connected both 
with each other as well as politically: Weir was on first name 
terms with Stanley Baldwin, and had been friends with Lithgow 
since well before the Great War.46 Balfour was an active member 
of the League; Weir also subscribed to it and financially supported 
it from at least 1920 to 1939. Lithgow – perhaps surprisingly given 
his near-constant vocal opposition to all forms of organised 
labour47 – had no traceable League connections (other than 
friendship with members). In discussion with the key 
industrialists, the PSOC focused on ‘bottlenecks’ in supply and 
constraints upon the future speed of rearmament. Though Weir, 
Lithgow and Balfour were concerned with the reduction in private 
manufacturing capacity that had been brought about by the 
economic and political circumstances of the past decade,48 they 
were also concerned by the lack of available skilled labour. This 
was likely, they believed, to be among the most intractable of 
problems: the political dynamite that any discussion on dilution or 
demarcation would set off would mean the issue was unlikely to 
ease in the foreseeable future.49 
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This was where the League came in, by ramping up its 
propaganda effort: the output of leaflets more than doubled 
between 1932 and 1935, and then doubled again between 1935 and 
1939, hitting 4.8m in 1938 against just 1m in 1931.50 This was, more 
or less, in direct response to the rebound in the labour market, 
where skilled workers in the engineering and shipbuilding sectors 
had been buoyed by the return of work after many painful years, 
and had (re)joined unions to demand better conditions and wage 
increases. As the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) put it, 
this was ‘a sign that the workers are not prepared to allow the bad 
conditions imposed upon them in the heavy years of the 
depression to continue indefinitely’.51 In a similar vein, Labour 
MP, Sir Stafford Cripps – at a speech to striking Beardmore 
workers – urged men not to let ‘the most glorious opportunity 
[they] have ever had’ pass by, as if they used the ‘necessities of 
capitalism to get power’, their employers would be ‘in your hands 
… helpless’.52 Cripps, known to the League for defending the 
Daily Worker in court during the League blacklist case, was 
articulating a message that, if nothing else, was ‘bad news’ for 
rearmament planners – and ‘bad news’ for business leaders.  
 
Of course, the League had a strategy by which to fight back. It did 
this in three ways. The first was to tackle opponents head on, by 
peppering industrial districts with leaflets warning of the ‘Red 
Menace’, giving public speeches several times a day, and generally 
showing the wealth created for ordinary people by the increased 
arms spending. One example from 1936 is typical of the way the 
League sought to discredit political opponents: 
 
You all know the Reds. They come to you in the factory, the 
shop, the pit, and invite you to join the Communist ‘cell’. They 
stand outside the gates and try to sell you the Daily Worker. If 
you are unemployed they try to get you to take part in 
demonstrations. And if you listen to them you realise they are 
always out for trouble, telling you to strike and demonstrate 
and follow the example of Russia.53  
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The paper continued in a similarly hyperbolic vein, calling the 
National Unemployed Workers’ Movement ‘just another Red 
organisation, controlled by Communists’. It concluded by warning 
that ‘these Reds that talk to you have no mind of their own. They 
are servants of their masters in Moscow.’54 While not quite class 
warfare, the aim was nevertheless abundantly clear. 
 
These attacks on ‘the Reds’ were pursued through targeted rallies 
in industrial districts. Regular updates, always marked 
‘confidential’, of activities and timetables of rallies were sent to 
companies ahead of time through regional bodies of League, 
although its opponents were kept guessing as to when and where 
would be targeted next. The second element in the League’s 
campaign was blacklisting. This amounted to an attempt to 
neutralise what it saw as the most dangerous and subversive 
elements in the agitation for better pay and conditions by 
targeting labour activists and securing their removal from 
employment in key industrial sectors. The League’s third arm was 
information, compiling reports on conditions within industry 
more generally, used to inform employers of potential dangers 
facing them, and how best to take preventative action. It was this 
final strand that exposed one of the League’s major failings.  
 
The problem with the League’s (and Baker White’s) propaganda 
and ‘research’, was that it was frequently conjecture and, often, 
inaccurate. LRD quickly found fault in its public propaganda: it 
pointed out in 1937, for instance, the League’s assertion that the 
‘average shareholding in Imperial Chemicals Industry (ICI) was 
£480’, and thus ‘controlled by a mass of small shareholders’, was 
deliberately misleading. Instead of showing that ICI was an 
example of ordinary people’s savings being used to control a 
gargantuan firm, the majority of the company was controlled by a 
tiny group, some with over £2.6m in holdings, or over 5,000 times 
the ‘average’ the League had given.55 This was far from the only 
example, or unique to the pressurised circumstances surrounding 
rearmament. A decade earlier, the same group could legitimately 
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accuse the League of serving up ‘economic facts in the most useful 
way to serve the[ir] interests’.56 While the LRD was hardly a 
‘neutral’ party in this debate, it is nevertheless telling how easily 
they could pick holes in its research findings. 
 
This pattern is repeated in confidential reports. From a sample of 
some of the major armaments manufacturers of the time, 
including Vickers, Beardmore, John Brown’s, Fairfield’s and the 
interests of men like Balfour, Weir and Lithgow, it is apparent that 
the accuracy of the League’s research was open to question, to put 
it mildly. Though most of the surviving collections are little more 
than the ‘anti-Red’ propaganda that the League was well known 
for, a small but significant portion is much more important. 
Moreover, the wildest – and most personal – attacks were reserved 
for these reports, and intended for private rather than public 
consumption. For example, a research paper found in the 
collections of Brown’s and Fairfield’s marked ‘strictly private and 
highly confidential’ entitled Revolutionary Agitation in the 
Engineering Industry, 1916 – 1936, outlined the League’s belief that: 
 
There is not the slightest doubt but that in the coming months 
the engineering industry as a whole will have to face a carefully 
prepared and highly organised Communist attack and will 
have to resist a deliberate attempt to bring about a cessation of 
work [and] an interruption of production throughout the whole 
of [the industry].57  
 
The paper supported its assertions by tracing the history of 
communist sentiments since 1916 along an upward trajectory. It 
thus purported to demonstrate that agitation was increasing and 
argued action must be taken. It claimed Moscow had instructed 
British factions to ‘concentrate activity primarily on the industries 
serving mobilisation for and the conduct of war’, and that the 
AEU had a presence at the meeting. For the evidence of where the 
attack was likely to come from, the paper provided a list of known 
agitators connected to engineering as a whole. Hugh 
Hinshelwood, former director of the Glasgow AEU committee, 
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was branded ‘Leader of the Agitation’ and member of the 
Communist Party, along with Jack Tanner from the executive 
board of the AEU nationally. A W. Ward, AEU chair in the district 
of Brown’s steelworks in Sheffield, was cited for speaking at four 
communist demonstrations in the last three years, while the report 
was highly critical of the shop stewards’ movement, noting its role 
in the ‘interruption of industry during the Great War’, and 
warning of similar things imminently in the current rearmament 
effort. To this end, David Kirkwood, Labour MP for Dumbarton 
Burghs, which constituency contained Brown’s Clydebank yard, 
William Gallacher, Communist MP for West Fife, and John 
Maclean, socialist educator and activist, are each at various points 
since 1916 dubbed ‘members of the Bolshevik Consul in 
Glasgow’58. The report concluded with the League urging 
‘necessary steps to counter and defeat the most carefully prepared 
communist plot that has been hatched in British industry since the 
1920s’.59  
 
The timing of this report is important. Circulated in autumn 1936, 
it immediately followed the vast increase in the naval programme, 
although it arrived before the first ships were due to be laid down, 
beginning January 1937. Brown’s and Fairfield’s had each secured 
one of the five major orders from this scheme - for the massive 
King George V class battleships, costing £7.5m each to construct. As 
such, two of the largest and most important orders in a generation 
were about to be embarked upon in these yards, making the 
League’s message especially relevant. Secondly, recent relations 
between the AEU and employers’ bodies had become severely 
strained. Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister for Co-ordination of 
Defence, and Lithgow had called for a measure of ‘goodwill’ 
between employers and unions, but the search for this set off 
vigorous reactions from the Engineering Employers’ Federation as 
well as the AEU. By June 1936, the AEU’s national committee had 
passed a resolution declaring that it would ‘definitely oppose’ any 
attempts to alter labour practices.60  
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Against this backdrop, the League’s warning must have sounded 
extremely frightening to employers. Given that the statement from 
Moscow was issued in 1929, a full seven years before the report 
was published, and well before there was any manifest chance of 
Britain mobilising for any future war, and that John Maclean had 
died a further six years previously in 1923, there is unsurprisingly 
little evidence that any of those mentioned were ever seriously 
organising a national ‘attack’ on industry, nor was there anything 
particularly revelatory about disclosing the fact that the AEU had 
members who were communist. The report, therefore, lies 
somewhere between conjecture and hysterical scaremongering, 
loosely based on fact but assembled to fit the authors’ purposes. It 
was at best, a crude method of buttressing the blacklisting of men 
who Baker White and the League abhorred for challenging the 
authority of their employers.  
 
Another research paper, entitled An Analysis of the Association of 
Leading Members of the Labour Party with Subsidiary Organisations of 
the Third International, from February 1938, continued in the same 
vein. It listed ‘Organisations deemed to be subversive by the 
Labour Party Executive and declared as ineligible for Membership 
of the Labour Party’. These organisations include the League 
against Imperialism, Friends of the Soviet Union, British Anti-War 
Movement and LRD.61 The paper then gave names of Labour MPs 
and members who were, thus, supposedly breaking party rules by 
having an association with these so-called subversive groups. 
Aneurin Bevan, Clement Attlee and Sir Stafford Cripps were all 
named, along with prominent Clydeside labour movement 
figures, including James Maxton, MP for Bridgeton, and Jennie 
Lee, who had been MP for North Lanarkshire from 1929-31.62 The 
clear implication was that individuals on this list were dangerous 
and that business and politics should refrain or withdraw from 
dealing with them. This was, again, little more than 
scaremongering. The Labour Party had never declared these 
organisations to be subversive, nor those included on the list, and 
the idea that Bevan and Lee were somehow conspiring to 
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interrupt the rearmament effort was plainly absurd, given their 
well-known and public criticisms of Chamberlain and 
appeasement, as is the association with Kirkwood, who openly 
argued that capital and labour were dependent on each other.63 
 
No target was too small. The League even took aim at the Left 
Book Club on several separate occasions, accusing it of being 
Moscow’s mouthpiece, and its chief editor, Victor Gollancz, 
appeared on the February 1938 list of Labour Party ‘subversives’.64 
The attack on the Left Book Club consisted of selecting quotes 
from opponents of the Club, including former subscribers, union 
representatives (who noted how ‘riddled’ the Club was with 
subversives) and anti-Communist members of the labour 
movement including Maxton’s Independent Labour Party (ILP) 
ally, John McGovern. Extremely complicated diagrams showing 
links between the Communist Party of Great Britain and the 
Club’s membership were produced (where much hinged on the 
membership of the Club by prominent communists, Harry Pollitt 
and John Strachey), with the general aim appearing to be to 
discredit not just the Club, but anything or anyone connected with 
it.  
 
Such flimsy research did not, however, mean reports like these 
were simply ignored, as the League had friends in the ‘right’ 
places. Sir Waldron Smithers, a Conservative MP and League 
Central Council member, managed to get reports into the hands 
of, among others, the Home Secretary, even asking questions in 
Parliament as to their opinions on the League’s work.65 ICI, 
headed by League Vice-President (Lord) Harry McGowan (called 
the ‘highest salaried industrialist in Britain’66), who insisted on 
‘autocratic central control’, was an indispensable part of the 
rearmament effort, particularly for the manufacture of explosives. 
Baker White also made a name for himself and the League’s 
research. Establishing the existence of secret German rearmament 
before Hitler came to power in 1932, Baker White passed on 
information to government departments, and although initially 
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not taken seriously (he was still a ‘non-official’ source), he did 
catch the eye of Churchill, who invited him to his home in Hyde 
Park Gate for meetings, which later became more frequent. He 
continued to meet Churchill, and send intelligence (now copied to 
the War Office) from 1935 until the outbreak of war.67  
 
Employers were listening too. In one example, Baker White wrote 
to S.W. Rawson, board member of John Brown’s and noted 
industrialist on both Clydeside and the north east of England, 
eight days after the publication of Revolutionary Agitation in the 
Engineering Industry. In a series of letters, Baker White reminded 
Rawson of an interview his firm had given to Captain Gribble of 
the League, as well the confidential papers from the intelligence 
department that had been left with the yard directors in Glasgow. 
Baker White then asked the Clydebank yard of Brown’s to 
increase its current donation, noting that Brown’s steel works in 
Sheffield was paying £250. Baker White, in seeking this funding 
increase, wrote: ‘I believe I am right in saying that the Allied 
Employers Federation regard the Economic League as the most 
competent body to deal with the threat of subversion and 
Communism in the industrial sphere’,68 before reiterating the 
desirability of more personal or company donations on top of the 
existing subscriptions. In the event, Brown’s increased its 
Clydebank payment, but with the stipulation that 75 per cent of it 
would go to the West of Scotland branch of the League.69  
 
Any continuance – or, indeed, increase – in donations during 
rearmament suggests that industry (or at least Brown’s) felt that 
both the threat of agitation was persisting or even rising, and that 
the League’s work was valuable in fighting it. It also suggests that 
the conclusions of the League reports were treated as valuable. 
Therefore, on the face of it, the claims made about Kirkwood, 
Cripps, the AEU and workers’ activity created additional 
industrial tension and destabilised the official attempts to secure 
more harmonious relationships between shipyard employers and 
the unions, which remained fractious for much of the later 1930s.70 
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Moreover, the effect of millions of pamphlets warning of a 
revolution on the credibility of unions among workers or the 
general population should not be under-estimated. Thus, while 
the dubious content of the League’s reports perhaps makes it easy 
to dismiss or even ridicule, evidence suggests otherwise.  
 
At this juncture, it is important to remember that the Economic 
League had a public face (propaganda) and a private face 
(research reports and bulletins) which by no means were identical 
positions. The small scale and scattered nature of surviving 
evidence has been noted. It is, nevertheless, plausible to conclude 
that the League felt little need to ‘educate’ subscribers of the 
benefits of capitalism (for they were already more than converted 
to that cause), and instead adopted if anything a more hysterical 
tone with its paid-up supporters. Though hyperbole about the 
‘menace’ of the left was a recurring feature of the League, content 
that warned of impending revolution or named names of 
‘agitators’ was largely toned down or absent entirely from 
publications designed for general consumption. At the very least, 
such warnings were not presented as research-based evidence. 
Moreover, details about the League’s activities – meetings held, 
pamphlets distributed, subscribers gained and so on – were 
exclusively reserved for members.  
 
The reasons for this, ostensibly at least, were that the League 
required credibility – or at least the absence of scandal 
surrounding false information – in order to function effectively 
and retain members. Furthermore, any advantage it had in 
dissemination of propaganda via ‘flying squads’ would, 
potentially, have been lost if too much were known of its patterns 
of activity, though in fairness the League was also hardly 
forthcoming with details about its plans and financial accounts 
even to its most loyal supporters. Though it might seem 
surprising, the League was if anything less scrupulous when 
communicating with subscribers, sticking to less controversial 
statements publicly while privately disclosing controversial 
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‘research’ material, which was perhaps not unwise: influential 
supporters needed ‘value’ for their dues, after all. 
 
Nevertheless, influence in high places and pamphlets distributed 
by the vanload seem to have counted for little on the ground. 
Within nine months of the AEU’s resolution to oppose any change 
in labour practices, 4,000 workers struck at Beardmore’s for a 
penny an hour rise, the first action of its kind at the yard in over 12 
years, and one that held up production for ten weeks. In 1938, 
another 4,000 struck at the recently opened Howitzer works in 
Parkhead without the support or permission of the AEU, over the 
jobs of 15 trainees, with workers arguing the job should be 
undertaken by journeymen. This took four months to bring to a 
conclusion, during which time Lithgow commented in the 
company’s annual report ‘there is intense pressure to meet 
government demand at Parkhead … in the middle of all this 
reorganisation, we have found ourselves embarrassed by a 
protracted strike of certain of our engineering employees’.71 These 
were followed elsewhere with two strikes within four days over 
tonnage bonuses being paid at the incorrect rate, affecting 1,800 
workers.72 The next year 300 plumbers at John Brown’s walked out 
in a dispute over demarcation.73  
 
This is just a small selection of cases; in all the number of 
industrial stoppages in Britain for the years between 1935 and 
1939 was three times that of the 1920s. In 1937, the League 
launched its ‘National Defence Campaign’, which had the ‘dual 
purpose of arousing industrial workers to the growing danger of 
and need for rearmament [and also] to counter subversion in the 
defence industries’.74 One year later, it claimed that a record 
693,000 days were lost in engineering and shipbuilding alone, 
involving some 91,400 workers in the preceding 12 months, and 
reiterated ‘the danger of Red activity and the need for the 
League’s defence campaign’.75 This was disingenuous: if in the 
year after the launching of the campaign stoppages had hit record 
levels, then if anything, it appears to directly contradict the idea 
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that the League’s work is useful in countering subversion, unless 
the League (or its subscribers) seriously believed it would have 
been much higher still without its intervention.  
 
In sum, while it cannot be sustained that the success or failure of 
the League’s work directly drove the frequency of industrial 
disputes, it does beg the question why, if the League was, indeed, 
so powerful – as has been argued elsewhere – it had so little effect 
on the labour movement in its industrial heartlands despite 
printing nearly 20m leaflets and hosting many hundreds of rallies 
during the rearmament phase. This is, undoubtedly, one of the 
major contradictions at the heart of the Economic League’s work. 
The answer to this question primarily lies in the nature of the 
League’s rhetoric. From its formation and throughout the 1920s, 
the League had been committed to ‘combating the fallacious 
economic doctrines of Collectivism, Socialism and Communism’ 
and ‘uphold[ing] individual freedom, enterprise and initiative’.76 
Despite pledging to educate the working classes about the benefits 
of capitalism, it expended great effort in the 1930s on fighting 
communism exclusively, rather than anti-socialism more 
generally. McIvor argued that this resulted from the experience of 
the two weak Labour governments in the 1920s, and of the ‘phobic 
anti-communist mentality of the Labour party and Trades Union 
Congress from 1932’.77 Indeed, a great majority of surviving 
pamphlets from this period, not to mention the content of the 
confidential reports, had this as their main focus.  
 
As rearmament wore on, the League’s bulletins struggled to 
choose between blaming the lack of British competitiveness in 
merchant shipping and shipbuilding on the excesses of the 
unionised labourer, and demonstrating that capitalism delivered 
higher standards of living than communism. For instance, in 1938 
one bulletin claimed it was ‘well-known fact that foreign wages 
are lower [and] … the standard of living is higher in Britain, [and] 
foreign seamen work for lower pay and under conditions that 
would not be tolerated here’, just weeks after another said the 
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League existed to ‘prove to the masses that under capitalism the 
standard of living of our people is the highest in the world’.78 
McIvor believed the League found it ‘politic tacitly to support this 
rightwards shift of what they regarded by this time as the 
respectable labour movement’.79 Yet, it could also be argued that 
the problem for the League was that it failed to separate 
‘respectable’ from subversive - painting Cripps, Kirkwood and 
other Labour leaders as dangerous Communists, when  they were, 
in fact, showing workers the value of organised labour operating 
within the capitalist system in a time of high bargaining power.  
 
In short, the League was shooting itself in the foot. Even its 
flagship National Defence Campaign, which advocated massive 
rearmament and projected the interests of many of its subscribers, 
emphasised the need to ‘counter communist efforts to impede 
production’.80 Some late, weak, examples of a belated change of 
tack by the League can be found in 1938’s ‘Facts about Strikes’ – 
part of a large series entitled Facts about – where the League 
claimed that the only person that benefitted from a strike is a 
communist agitator,81 or in the same year, another pamphlet 
which argued striking ‘plays into the hands of the enemy’, and 
that the League existed to combat unemployment.82 The League 
even tried to claim, in a very roundabout way, that it was not 
opposed to trade unionism,83 though its considerable hysterical 
opposition to collective action throughout the 1930s made this 
appear rather insincere.84 
 
The League was, thus, focussing its considerable reserves of time 
and money on the ‘wrong’ target, paranoid of an extremely 
unlikely revolutionary overhaul of the capitalist system instead of 
promoting the broader points of profits for workers in a capitalist 
rather than communist system. As the bulletins above show, it 
was unable to do this without couching it in anti-communist 
hysteria, or without appearing to be on the side of the employers 
(and subscribers) in criticising high wages for workers. Ironically, 
it was the labour movement, the ‘respectable’ part, which was 
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better at defending workers’ rights and championing 
improvements to pay and conditions while the League, for all its 
connections and financial might, stuck to obliterating the radical 
fringe through hyperbole or sinister blacklisting schemes that, in 
keeping with the theme, selected the wrong targets too often. The 
ultimate result of this was that their subscribers, believing the 
League to be fighting for them, were increasingly given poor 
quality or patently false research indicating the imminent threat of 
communism when its resources could, in all probability, have 
been used to foster a more efficient and co-operative rearmament 
drive between employer and employee and a general 
advancement of the ‘cause for capitalism’.  
 
Moreover, the League spent too much of the 1930s advocating a 
tactic that many employers and military figures baulked at. The 
League supported confrontation, while businesses – and Weir, and 
others in the Committee of Imperial Defence – thought otherwise. 
Though Lithgow was a loud and outspoken voice in favour of 
dilution, piecework and elimination of demarcation, numerous 
subcommittees involved with defence planning (but not, it seems, 
the Economic League), understood that in order for ‘business as 
usual’ – a central philosophy of Neville Chamberlain’s period as 
Chancellor and Prime Minister – to prevail for as long as possible 
during rearmament, the co-operation of labour was essential.85 
Fearing a further exacerbation of a skills shortage if unpopular 
changes were forced through, the government urged extreme 
caution when dealing with unions for skilled workers. The 
Shipbuilding Employers’ Federation, which in 1935 believed a 
‘profound change in industrial practice’ was necessary to relieve 
the skills shortage, noticeably toned down its message by 1939.86 
To this end, even Lithgow tempered his criticism of labour 
practices he believed to be hampering productivity. In short, while 
businesses in the armaments sector may have been ‘up for a fight’ 
with labour before 1937, once the naval (and other) programmes 
began in earnest, they increasingly understood that now was not 
the time. Of course, workers still used their renewed bargaining 
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power and struck – as Cripps called it, using capitalism to gain 
power – but the employer responses were on the whole not, and 
could not be, to bring in wholesale changes in production 
practices. In this sense, the League was increasingly out of touch 
with those it should have been closest to. 
 
It is, perhaps, to be expected though that not even these failures 
dented the standing of League members. Once war broke out its 
young director, John Baker White, did use his experience and 
connections to find himself employment. Aptly, this was in 
intelligence with Section D, an organisation he had initially been 
recruited for in the 1920s (and the precursor to the Special 
Operations Executive), before moving later to the Political Warfare 
Executive.87 Here, Baker White was charged with creating 
propaganda, not for the home front, but for the enemy. He would 
concoct false and misleading stories to feed to the Germans with 
the aim of confusing them and giving false impressions of the state 
of British defences. One such example included convincing them 
of a failed German invasion of Britain. He would later write about 
his experiences in a book called, perhaps fittingly, The Big Lie.88 
 
Conclusion 
 
McIvor concluded his discussion of the League by remarking it 
was ‘one of the most powerful right-wing employers’ groups to 
emerge’ after the First World War.89 In many ways, the new 
sources and interpretations introduced in this paper support this 
claim. Moreover, the difficulties around researching the League 
underscore the great service McIvor and Hughes have performed 
in establishing facts about its work. This said, one can suggest that 
the League was more than just an employers’ group, and, despite 
its rhetoric, was supported by both moderate and hard-line 
conservatives. The League was unusually well connected, not just 
as a corporate network of leading businessmen, but integrated 
with policy machinery through representatives on bodies in the 
Committee for Imperial Defence and steered in its early phases by 
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Conservative politicians with military and intelligence 
backgrounds.  
 
The uniting factor was a visceral hatred of the left and of 
organised labour, but it did not necessarily take being a fascist to 
believe in those values: the League was an odd mix of respectable 
businessmen, politicians, and military figures. Indeed, the League 
should be seen in the context of a longer and larger anti-union 
campaign which had been running since before the First World 
War, and in the context of Conservative politics of the day. In 
many ways, the League reinforced what were larger class-driven 
narratives that were inherently suspicious – even outright 
contemptuous – of the working class. As McKibbin has argued, a 
central pillar of Conservative electoral strength between the wars 
was the party’s ability to ‘split’ working class votes by convincing 
swathes of non-unionised workers that unions damaged the 
country, damaged the economy and (eventually) damaged British 
security. The claim from the right that they ought to fear 
organised labour, and indeed the Labour Party itself, worked 
remarkably well in elections before 1925. In this light, the League’s 
‘educational’ mission takes on extra meaning.90  
 
This partly explains the ‘respectable’ members the League could 
attract. This was undoubtedly helpful: it added legitimacy to its 
work, got it talked about in Parliament, and probably ensured 
continuing financial support for the League’s work. However, 
despite the long reach of the Economic League’s tentacles, it did 
not gain men like Weir or Balfour further influence because of 
League membership; it was clearly the case that they were almost 
always well-established figures well before the organisation was 
born. Moreover, though the League may have liked to have 
claimed success in staving off the ‘revolution’ that was threatening 
rearmament, perhaps the most striking aspect is the absence of 
success in its attempts to destroy organised labour in spite of its 
privileged position. This is the contradiction at the heart of the 
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Economic League in the 1930s, and came about in three main 
ways.  
 
Firstly, it seems the League’s elite members benefitted from it 
more than the League benefitted from them. Those already well-
connected, like Balfour, did not gain respectability through senior 
positions in the League. Baker White, by far the most prolific 
author during the 1920s and 1930s and in many ways the League’s 
public face, found only modest success in the British 
establishment. Indeed, despite 13 years at the helm, he never rose 
to the level of influence of some of the League’s backers, and is 
barely remembered. Secondly, the research reports produced by 
the League were too often weak and riddled with faults, so in 
reality they served to do little more than promote distrust between 
not only employer and employee, but employers and union 
officials. Ironically, rather than eliminating opposition and 
obstructions to rearmament, all this tactic achieved was to provide 
employers with incentives not to negotiate, and be obstructive 
themselves. Such an approach would not – and did not – lead to 
positive results, and, if one measures the success of the League’s 
propaganda message in the 1930s, especially after rearmament 
began, it unsurprisingly does not appear to have worked 
particularly well. Union membership steadily increased, and 
union-approved industrial stoppages by 1940 had trebled against 
the figure a decade earlier.91 Thirdly, though employers certainly 
continued to distrust unions, they (and particularly Chamberlain 
and those in the Committee of Imperial Defence after 1937) 
increasingly realised further antagonism ran counter to their 
interests. As time wore on, the League’s rhetoric remained radical 
while employers and defence planners grew more cautious. With 
no communist revolution in British industry in sight, despite 
warnings, the League lost momentum. On the one hand, such 
propaganda can still be claimed a success for the League: arguably 
the League appealed to the pragmatism of workers who took the 
view that striking for better conditions within the capitalist system 
was better than turning to another means – communism – 
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altogether. On the other hand, it nevertheless appears that the 
fight against the rhetoric of Cripps and others failed; the League 
was unable to halt the resurgence of the labour movement in a 
time of high demand for skill. Ironically, a (temporary) case for 
capitalism arguably was made and accepted in the second half of 
the 1930s, but not by the Economic League. 
 
When the propaganda message did not work as hoped, even after 
doubling the output of pamphlets, the nastier side of the League 
began to emerge. In this light, it appears desperate. In this sense, 
blacklisting was all that was left for an organisation that, in theory, 
possessed great influence and resources, but had come up well 
short against its primary targets. Of course, only the propaganda 
element of the League now survives in any real quantity, but the 
content of the sources above and, thus, the findings of this article 
open up the distinct possibility that a great many men and women 
were wrongly added to a – long since destroyed – blacklist, or 
mentioned in a report in a desperate attempt to further an agenda, 
and a large portion had their livelihoods taken away as a result. 
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